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Abstract
Background: Workers in clinical microbiology laboratories are exposed to a variety of pathogenic microorganisms.
Salmonella species is among the most commonly reported bacterial causes of laboratory-acquired infections. We
report on three cases of laboratory-acquired Salmonella enterica serotype Typhi (Salmonella Typhi) infection which
occurred over the period 2012 to 2016 in South Africa.
Methods: Laboratory investigation included phenotypic and genotypic characterization of isolates. Phenotypic
analysis included standard microbiological identification techniques, serotyping and antimicrobial susceptibility
testing. Genotypic analysis included the molecular subtyping methodologies of pulsed-field gel electrophoresis
analysis, multilocus sequence typing and whole-genome sequencing (WGS); with WGS data analysis including
phylogenetic analysis based upon comparison of single nucleotide polymorphism profiles of isolates.
Results: All cases of laboratory-acquired infection were most likely the result of lapses in good laboratory practice
and laboratory safety. The following critical issues were highlighted. There was misdiagnosis and misreporting of
Salmonella Typhi as nontyphoidal Salmonella by a diagnostic laboratory, with associated public health implications.
We highlight issues concerning the importance of accurate fluoroquinolone susceptibility testing and interpretation
of results according to updated guidelines. We describe potential shortcomings of a single disk susceptibility
screening test for fluoroquinolone susceptibility and suggest that confirmatory minimum inhibitory concentration
testing should always be performed in cases of invasive Salmonella infections. These antimicrobial susceptibility
testing issues resulted in inappropriate ciprofloxacin therapy which may have been responsible for failure in
clearance of pathogen from patients. Salmonella Typhi capsular polysaccharide vaccine was not protective in one
case, possibly secondarily to a faulty vaccine.
Conclusions: Molecular subtyping of isolates proved effective to investigate the genetic relatedness of isolates.
Molecular subtyping data interpreted together with epidemiological data allowed us to pinpoint the most likely
sources for our cases of laboratory-acquired infection.
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Background
Workers in clinical microbiology laboratories are exposed
to a variety of pathogenic microorganisms [1, 2]. A review
of published literature in 2009, reported that bacteria
account for the greatest number of reports of laboratory-
acquired infections; Shigella species, Brucella species,
Salmonella species, Mycobacterium tuberculosis and
Neisseria meningitidis were the most commonly reported
bacterial causes of laboratory-acquired infections [1].
There have been very few reports of laboratory-
acquired infections involving Salmonella enterica sero-
type Typhi (Salmonella Typhi), however many may go
unreported. A PubMed literature search on 1 February
2017, using the key words ‘Salmonella Typhi laboratory
acquired infection’ found 12 publications (English lan-
guage) reporting laboratory-acquired Salmonella Typhi
infections [3–14]. These 12 papers were published over
the period 1961 to 1997, so over the last 10 years, to the
best of our knowledge, there are no recent publications of
laboratory-acquired Salmonella Typhi infections. How-
ever, more recently, there have been reports of nontyphoi-
dal Salmonella (NTS) laboratory-acquired infections. In
2016, a Salmonella enterica serotype Typhimurium (Sal-
monella Typhimurium) laboratory-acquired infection was
reported from Canada by Alexander and coworkers [15];
while in 2014 and 2012, the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) reported on Salmonella Typhimur-
ium outbreaks in the USA of which the source of the out-
breaks were traced to university teaching microbiology
laboratories [16, 17] In 2015, Barker and coworkers
reported on a Salmonella Enteritidis laboratory-acquired
infection [18].
In our present study, we report on three cases of
laboratory-acquired Salmonella Typhi infection which
occurred over the period 2012 to 2016 in South Africa.
We demonstrate the usefulness of various molecular




Three cases of laboratory-acquired Salmonella Typhi
infection occurred over the period 2012 to 2016 in
South Africa. We describe these as follows.
Case one
In September 2012, a laboratory technologist working at
Laboratory-A presented to her clinician with signs of
severe malaise, fever and mild diarrhoea. The technolo-
gist had six years of working experience in a clinical
microbiology laboratory. Blood cultures were collected
for laboratory testing. The diagnostic laboratory identi-
fied Salmonella using the MALDI Biotyper and the
isolate failed to agglutinate in Salmonella Typhi-specific
antisera. Subsequently, the isolate was reported to the
clinician as NTS, susceptible to fluoroquinolones. The
patient was treated with seven days of oral ciprofloxacin.
The isolate was referred to the Centre for Enteric Dis-
eases (CED) at the National Institute for Communicable
Diseases (NICD), for confirmation of identification. The
CED confirmed Salmonella Typhi with intermediate
resistance to fluoroquinolones [ciprofloxacin minimum
inhibitory concentration (MIC), 0.25 μg/ml] and suscep-
tibility to azithromycin (MIC, 4 μg/ml). The patient,
though recovered, was still excreting Salmonella Typhi
in her stool and was then treated with a combination of
azithromycin and fluoroquinolone for 14 days. Subse-
quent stools tested negative for Salmonella Typhi. The
patient, being a laboratory technologist with frequent ex-
posure to Salmonella Typhi, had received Salmonella
Typhi vaccination nine months earlier as part of an
occupational health program. On investigation, it was
found that this vaccine was part of a batch recalled by
the manufacturer, because of potentially low (below
specification) antigen content [19] .
Case two
In February 2016, a trainee clinical pathology resident
working on the stool bench at a clinical microbiology la-
boratory (Laboratory-B), presented to a physician with
fever, nausea and vomiting. The patient was admitted to
hospital and discharged three days later. Salmonella
Typhi was cultured from microbiological cultures of
blood taken on admission. The isolate was referred to
the CED for confirmation of identification. The CED
confirmed Salmonella Typhi with susceptibility to fluor-
oquinolones (ciprofloxacin MIC, 0.008 μg/ml) and to
azithromycin (MIC, 8 μg/ml). The patient responded
well to levofloxacin therapy. Further investigation re-
vealed that the patient had recently serotyped a clinical
isolate of Salmonella Typhi in the laboratory and had
not worn gloves at the time. The patient had one year of
working experience in a clinical microbiology laboratory
and had not been vaccinated against Salmonella Typhi.
Case three
In October 2016, a laboratory technologist working in a
clinical microbiology laboratory (Laboratory-C) started
complaining of headaches at work. His colleagues of-
fered him an over the counter analgesic but his symp-
toms persisted. He reported to a hospital emergency
room with symptoms of diarrhoea, worsening headaches,
temperatures of 39 °C and severe malaise; he was admit-
ted into hospital. Blood chemistry revealed raised liver
enzymes and a C-reactive protein (CRP) reading of
90 mg/L. Blood cultures were collected for laboratory
testing; Salmonella Typhi was cultured. The diagnostic
laboratory determined that the isolate was susceptible to
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ceftriaxone and the fluoroquinolones (Kirby-Bauer disk
susceptibility testing method - pefloxacin disk (5-μg)
screening zone size of 25 mm). The patient was com-
menced on intravenous ciprofloxacin by the treating
physician. He received seven days of intravenous
ciprofloxacin followed up by a seven-day course of oral
ciprofloxacin on discharge. The isolate was referred to
the CED for confirmation of identification. The CED
confirmed the Salmonella Typhi identification and deter-
mined that the isolate was intermediately-resistant to
fluoroquinolones (ciprofloxacin MIC, 0.25 μg/ml) and
susceptible to azithromycin (MIC, 4 μg/ml). Salmonella
Typhi with the same MICs was isolated from subsequent
stool samples, collected 16 days and 19 days after the
blood culture sample tested positive. The patient was
contacted by the treating private physician and readmit-
ted to hospital where he received five days of intraven-
ous azithromycin. On discharge he was prescribed
combination therapy comprising of oral ciprofloxacin and
azithromycin for one month. Subsequent stools tested
negative for Salmonella Typhi. The technologist had
28 months working experience in a clinical microbiology
laboratory and had no history of vaccination against
typhoid fever. Epidemiological investigation determined
that the technologist had been exposed to Salmonella
Typhi while processing a culture of Salmonella Typhi.
Identification of typhoid fever cases and public health
response
Typhoid fever is a notifiable disease in South Africa.
Based on laboratory diagnosis, typhoid fever is relatively
uncommon in South Africa. Laboratory networks report
the isolation of Salmonella Typhi to the Outbreak Re-
sponse Unit of the NICD, who in turn notify the district
and provincial communicable diseases coordinators.
Cases are investigated through a home visit, interviewed
and a case investigation form is completed. Cases are
later followed up and include further testing of stool
samples. For persons who have had contact with cases,
their symptoms are assessed and stool samples are also
collected for testing. Details of all cases, including pa-
tient occupation are reported to the NICD and recorded
in a database. Databases are reviewed to identify cases
whose occupation includes laboratory work; data col-
lection includes demographic details, clinical and
treatment history and outcome data. For the currently
described three cases: all patients came from relatively
affluent and hygienic home circumstances, and there
was no suggestion of family members being ill or
other likely sources of infection; laboratory infection
control procedures and laboratory safety policies were
reviewed and refresher staff training was conducted;
we contacted patients and obtained written informed
consent to describe their case.
Referral of bacterial isolates to the CED
The CED is the national reference centre in South Africa
for human infections due to enteric pathogens including:
Salmonella species, Shigella species, Campylobacter
species, diarrhoeagenic Escherichia coli, Vibrio cholerae
and Listeria monocytogenes. Isolates from across South
Africa are voluntarily submitted to the CED through na-
tional laboratory-based surveillance from >200 clinical
microbiology laboratories across the country, in relation
to potential outbreaks. The CED proceeds with pheno-
typic and genotypic characterization of isolates. If
required, molecular subtyping of isolates is performed.
To determine if these cases of typhoid fever in
laboratory-workers were acquired from the isolates to
which they were exposed in the laboratory, we identified
isolates of Salmonella Typhi that were submitted to the
CED from the laboratory in which the patient worked
during the two months prior to onset of illness and sub-
jected these isolates and the patient’s isolate to pheno-
typic and genotypic characterization, as described below.
Phenotypic characterization of bacteria
Bacteria were received on Dorset-Egg transport media
[Diagnostic Media Products (DMP), National Health La-
boratory Service, Johannesburg, South Africa] and sub-
cultured onto 5% Blood Agar (DMP), to check for viabil-
ity and purity. Cultures were identified using standard
phenotypic microbiological identification and serotyping
techniques, briefly described as follows. As required,
bacterial colonies were identified using the VITEK-2
COMPACT 15 automated microbial identification sys-
tem (bioMérieux, Marcy-l’Étoile, France). Serotyping
was performed according to the White-Kauffmann-Le
Minor Scheme. Antimicrobial susceptibility testing was
performed using the VITEK-2 COMPACT 15 system
(bioMérieux) and the Etest method (bioMérieux). Inter-
pretation of antimicrobial susceptibility data was done in
accordance with the Clinical and Laboratory Standards
Institute (CLSI) [20].
PCR for the H58 haplotype of Salmonella Typhi
PCR to determine whether Salmonella Typhi isolates
belonged to the H58 haplotype were performed accord-
ing to the methodology described by Murgia and
coworkers [21].
Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) analysis of
bacteria
PFGE analysis of XbaI digested genomic DNA was per-
formed using a Bio-Rad CHEF-DR III electrophoresis
system (Bio-Rad Laboratories, Hercules, USA), following
a PulseNet protocol [22]. PFGE patterns were analyzed
using BioNumerics (version 6.5) Software (Applied
Maths, Sint-Martens-Latem, Belgium) with dendrograms
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of the patterns created using the unweighted pair group
method with arithmetic averages, with analysis of band-
ing patterns incorporating the Dice-coefficient at an
optimization setting of 1.5% and a position tolerance
setting of 1.5%.
Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) analysis of bacteria
Genomic DNA was isolated from bacteria using the Qia-
gen QIAamp DNA Mini Kit (Qiagen, Hilden, Germany).
DNA libraries were prepared using a Nextera XT DNA
Library Preparation Kit (Illumina, San Diego, CA, USA),
followed by a 2 × 300 paired-end sequencing runs with
100× coverage using Illumina MiSeq equipment. Raw
data generated on the MiSeq was further analyzed using
tools available in the CLC Genomics Workbench Soft-
ware, version 8.5 (Qiagen). Using the ‘Trim Sequences
Tool’, sequence reads were trimmed to include quality
trimming and ambiguity trimming, and length trimming
to discard reads below a length of 50 bases. Trimmed
reads were assembled using the ‘De novo Assembly
Tool’; the assembly algorithm works by using de Bruijn
graphs to produce contiguous (contig) sequences (mini-
mum contig length was set at 200 bases).
Multilocus sequence typing (MLST) of bacteria
Assembled genome data was analyzed using the ‘multilo-
cus sequence typing (MLST)’ on-line analysis pipeline
available at the Center for Genomic Epidemiology (CGE)
of the Technical University of Denmark [23]. MLST pro-
duces sequence types (STs) based on sequence analysis
of seven housekeeping genes (aroC, dnaN, hemD, hisD,
purE, sucA and thrA), as described at the Salmonella
MLST database [24].
Single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) profiles and
phylogenetic analysis of bacteria
Assembled genome data was analyzed using the ‘CSI-
Phylogeny 1.4’ on-line analysis pipeline available at the
CGE [25]. The CSIPhylogeny pipeline uses various pub-
licly available programs and the analysis steps are briefly
described as follows: assembled genome data is aligned
against a reference genome and single nucleotide
polymorphisms (SNPs) are called; SNPs are filtered
and qualified; final qualified SNPs for each genome is
concatenated to an alignment; phylogeny is then
inferred based on a comparison of SNP alignments of
strains. SNPs were called by alignment and referen-
cing against a South African strain isolated in 2016
(reference number TCD981492). SNP alignments were
analyzed with iTOL software [26] to generate phylo-
genetic maximum-likelihood trees.
Results
The results for molecular subtyping of isolates are as
follows.
For case one, molecular subtyping using PFGE analysis
showed that the PFGE pattern of the patient’s isolate
was indistinguishable (100% identical) to that of a PFGE
pattern shown by a cluster of Salmonella Typhi isolates
that the patient (laboratory technologist) had been work-
ing on in Laboratory-A (Fig. 1), suggesting that the
source of the patient’s infection was within this cluster
of isolates that the patient had been working on. This
‘cluster of isolates’ was sourced from a region of South
Africa located ~1500 km from where the laboratory
technologist lived and worked; also the laboratory tech-
nologist had no travel history or any history of contact
with persons that lived/travelled to this region of South
Africa. Therefore, this could not have been a case of
community exposure to Salmonella Typhi. For case one,
MLST presented a ST 1 subtype for the patient’s isolate;
the isolate was also PCR-positive for a marker associated
with haplotype H58, a haplotype of Salmonella Typhi
which is being reported with increasing frequency from
many countries in Africa and Asia [27, 28].
For case two, molecular subtyping of isolates included
PFGE analysis, MLST and SNP profiling. We investi-
gated all Salmonella Typhi isolates that the patient (resi-
dent) could have been exposed to in Laboratory-B.
Compared to three possible isolates, PFGE analysis
showed a PFGE pattern match (Fig. 2) to a single isolate
(isolate A) from Laboratory-B. Phylogenetic analysis and
SNP profiling showed that isolate A was related to case
two; the isolates only differed by 41 SNPs (Fig. 2). Both
isolates also presented the MLST ST 2 subtype and both
were PCR-negative for the marker associated with haplo-
type H58. These data suggested that the source of the
patient’s infection was isolate A. The patient later con-
firmed that she had indeed worked with isolate A.
For case three, molecular subtyping of isolates
included PFGE analysis, MLST and SNP profiling. We
investigated all Salmonella Typhi isolates that the patient
(laboratory technologist) could have been exposed to in
Laboratory-C. Compared to two possible isolates (iso-
lates B and C) that the patient could have been exposed
to in Laboratory-C; PFGE analysis showed a PFGE pat-
tern match (Fig. 3) to one of the isolates (isolate B). This
was supported by MLST; case three presented ST 1
which matched the ST 1 of isolate B; isolate C presented
ST 2 and so did not match the case. The case isolate
and isolate B were both PCR-positive for the marker as-
sociated with haplotype H58. Phylogenetic analysis and
SNP profiling confirmed that isolate B was highly related
to case three with the isolates only differing by 6 SNPs
(Fig. 3). These data suggested that the source of the
patient’s infection was isolate B.






Fig. 2 Molecular subtyping of Salmonella Typhi isolates. Snapshots are shown from dendrograms and phylogenetic trees of all South African
isolates. a Snapshot from a dendrogram of PFGE (XbaI digestion) patterns (b) Snapshot from a phylogenetic maximum-likelihood tree drawn
using SNP alignments. Note: isolate 958151 was isolated from a specimen collected on 4 June 2016 (4 months after isolation of the case 2
isolate), so case 2 could not have been exposed to isolate 958151
Case 1
Fig. 1 Snapshot from a dendrogram of PFGE (XbaI digestion) patterns for all South African isolates of Salmonella Typhi (the blocked section
indicates a cluster of isolates)
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Discussion
Case one highlight’s issues concerning the misdiagnosis
and misreporting of a Salmonella Typhi isolate as a NTS
by a diagnostic laboratory; with associated public health
implications, as typhoid fever is a notifiable disease in
most countries including South Africa. Salmonella Typhi
has a high potential to cause outbreaks of disease [29,
30], therefore rapid diagnosis and reporting to the health
authorities is vital to ensure appropriate investigation in-
cluding follow up of the patient and tracing the patient’s
contacts, as well as to design interventions to avert any
potential outbreak.
Cases one and three highlights issues concerning the
importance of accurate fluoroquinolone susceptibility
testing and interpretation of results according to up-
dated guidelines [20]. For case one, the patient was
treated initially with inappropriate therapy with cipro-
floxacin due to the use of defunct interpretative criteria
for fluoroquinolone resistance [31], which was later
followed with appropriate therapy with azithromycin.
For case three, the discrepancy between the pefloxacin
screening result (25 mm or susceptible) and the cipro-
floxacin MIC (0.25 μg/ml or intermediately-resistant) for
the isolate highlights the potential shortcomings of a sin-
gle disk susceptibility screening test for fluoroquinolone
susceptibility and suggests that confirmatory MIC
testing should always be performed in cases of inva-
sive Salmonella infections. While appropriate anti-
microbial therapy does not always result in clearance
of Salmonella Typhi from the stool, in both cases one
and three, treatment with ciprofloxacin to which the
isolates were intermediately-resistant failed to clear
the pathogen whilst subsequent therapy with azithro-
mycin [32] was successful.
All cases highlight issues concerning Salmonella Typhi
vaccination of laboratory workers who are at high risk of
exposure to Salmonella Typhi. Neither of the two
laboratory workers described in cases two or three had
received a Salmonella Typhi vaccination, despite expo-
sures to pure cultures. Case one had received vaccine
based on Vi polysaccharide antigen, but no currently
available vaccine against typhoid is 100% protective; vac-
cination decreases risk of infection but does not com-
pletely eliminate the risk of infection. Vaccine failures
are reported [33, 34]. For case one, vaccination was inef-
fective; vaccine failure may have occurred secondary to a
faulty vaccine. In developed countries such as the USA,
Canada, United Kingdom and Denmark; vaccination
against Salmonella Typhi is offered to and encouraged
for laboratory workers who are at high risk of exposure
to Salmonella Typhi, such as those working in reference
laboratories. In South Africa, this is certainly the policy
and procedure at the CED at the NICD; however not all
laboratory networks in South Africa provide occupation-
specific vaccination. For reference laboratories in most
other African countries, vaccination of laboratory workers
against Salmonella Typhi is not routine practice. In 1980,
a review of Salmonella Typhi laboratory-acquired infec-
tions reported that of 24 cases, the vast majority of pa-
tients (19 cases; 79.2%) had not been vaccinated; so lack of
vaccination is a definite risk factor [8].
All our cases of laboratory-acquired infection were
most likely the result of lapses in good laboratory prac-
tice (GLP) and laboratory safety. Case one had six years
of working experience in a clinical microbiology labora-
tory, yet laboratory-infection still occurred. Lapses in la-
boratory safety do occur, even among laboratory workers








Fig. 3 Molecular subtyping of Salmonella Typhi isolates. Snapshots are shown from dendrograms and phylogenetic trees of all South African
isolates. a Snapshot from a dendrogram of PFGE (XbaI digestion) patterns (b) Snapshot from a phylogenetic maximum-likelihood tree drawn
using SNP alignments
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microbiology laboratory. A recent report in 2015
described an NTS infection involving a laboratory tech-
nician with 20 years of experience in a clinical micro-
biology laboratory [18]. Over recent years, the
decreasing numbers of reports concerning Salmonella
laboratory-acquired infections probably reflect the
current increased awareness and practice of GLP and la-
boratory safety. Risky procedures such as mouth-
pipetting are now no longer practiced. Today, clinical
microbiology laboratories in most countries enforce uni-
form safety policies nationwide, which would include:
safety training; restricted laboratory access; use of bio-
logical safety cabinets; personal protective equipment
(PPE) (gloves, masks, coats, etc.); hand-washing facilities
with automatic-operating taps or elbow operating taps
and automatic-operating paper towel dispensers; prohi-
biting eating, drinking and smoking in the laboratory;
prohibiting cell phones in the laboratory; proper decon-
tamination of laboratory benches before and after work-
ing with clinical specimens and bacterial cultures; etc.
Laboratory accreditation to International Organization
for Standardization (ISO) requirements ensures compli-
ance and audit safety policies; diagnostic laboratories in
South Africa are all accredited against the ISO 15189
standard [35]. With regards to use of biological safety
cabinets, in South Africa (and most African countries),
these are not mandatory for working with Salmonella
Typhi. However, for some laboratories in Europe and
the USA, it is mandatory to work with Salmonella Typhi
within a biological safety cabinet (cabinets with a mini-
mum of level-2 safety) or within a biosafety level-2
laboratory.
Molecular subtyping of bacterial isolates is an effective
methodology to investigate the relatedness of bacterial
isolates and to investigate the source of the infections.
Molecular subtyping, including PFGE analysis [3, 15–18]
and WGS [15], has previously been reported to investi-
gate laboratory-acquired infections involving Salmonella
species. In particular, Alexander and coworkers [15] used
WGS to identify the source of a laboratory-acquired in-
fection involving a laboratory technologist; interestingly,
the technologist was not responsible for any testing con-
ducted on the causative strain, so it was concluded that
the infection was probably acquired while cleaning la-
boratory benches or discarding biohazardous waste.
For our current cases, all isolates were investigated
with PFGE analysis. Although PFGE analysis is an older
molecular subtyping methodology, it still provides valu-
able information and still remains the primary bacterial
subtyping methodology employed by PulseNet Inter-
national, a molecular subtyping network for foodborne
and waterborne disease surveillance. PFGE analysis is
limited in that it may not always provide sufficient reso-
lution; for example, if you have a case isolate and you
query a database of isolates to find a closest match by
genetic relatedness, you may find that the case isolate
will equally match (by PFGE pattern) a number of
isolates. This was the situation for our case one, where
the PFGE pattern for the case isolate was found to
match a PFGE pattern represented by a cluster of iso-
lates (Fig. 1), suggesting that the source of the laboratory
worker’s infection was within this cluster of isolates that
the laboratory worker had handled. To pinpoint the best
possible epidemiological match, PFGE data analyzed
together with epidemiological data (dates, geographic
locations, patient contact information, etc.) is helpful.
This was the situation for cases two and three, whereby
PFGE data interpreted together with epidemiological
data allowed us to pinpoint the most likely source of the
laboratory worker’s infection; source isolate A for case
two (Fig. 2) and source isolate B for case three (Fig. 3).
For any finer degree of resolution, alternative molecu-
lar subtyping methodologies must be employed. The ul-
timate methodology is WGS data analysis; this WGS
methodology was used to investigate isolates for cases
two and three, thereby providing a secondary analysis to
the primary PFGE analysis. Our analysis of WGS data
included a phylogenetic analysis based upon a compari-
son of SNP profiles. When the number of SNP differ-
ences is compared among isolates, the lowest number of
SNP differences implies the closest genetic relationship.
This allowed us to determine the exact genetic similarity
between a case isolate and its probable source. For case
two, the case isolate and the probable source isolate (iso-
late A) differed by only 41 SNPs and were located within
close proximity on a phylogenetic tree (Fig. 2). For case
three, the case isolate and the probable source isolate
(isolate B) differed by only 6 SNPs and were located
within close proximity on a phylogenetic tree (Fig. 3).
Lastly, a third molecular subtyping methodology,
MLST, was employed to investigate our case isolates.
MLST is generally more suitable for a long-term epi-
demiological comparison of isolates or a global compari-
son of isolates. However, in some cases of short-term
epidemiological investigations (outbreak investigations),
it can sometimes provide valuable supporting data. This
was the situation for case three, whereby the laboratory
worker had acquired his infection by exposure to two
possible isolates; isolate B with MLST ST 1 or isolate C
with MLST ST 2. The case three isolate presented
MLST ST 1, providing evidence supporting isolate B as
the cause of the infection.
Conclusions
Laboratory-acquired infection of Salmonella Typhi is
uncommon, as the risk of infection is low if appropriate
laboratory safety policies are in place and adhered to.
Nonetheless, accidental infections still do occur and
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would most likely be the result of lapses in aseptic tech-
niques. In these situations, molecular subtyping of
bacterial isolates is very useful to investigate the source
of infections.
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